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I. INTRODUCTION

As the number of United States corporations operating
internationally increases,' so does apprehension that these
corporations are exploiting lower labor standards overseas in an
attempt to maximize corporate profits. 2 The number of entities with
global operations increased over 300% between 1990 and 2000,3 and
the practice of transitioning U.S. businesses from domestic-based
4
operations into the global marketplace has become common.
"Globalization is now a fact of life for many American businesses and
their employees. Business operations have increasingly expanded
beyond U.S. borders either directly or through affiliations of varying
kinds with foreign-based entities." 5 These international corporations
(ICs) 6 are suspected of operating in violation of globally recognized
1. See Carrie Hall, Are Emerging Market TNCs Sensitive to Corporate
Responsibility Issues? Observations from the United Nations Global Compact, J.
CORP. CITIZENSHIP, June 22, 2007, at 30. See also Stephen B. Moldof, The
Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Activities and Employees Outside the United
States, 17 LAB. LAW. 417 (2002). Globalization of businesses has "important
potential implications for labor-management relations and issues." Id.
2. Rachel Cherington, Comment, Securities Laws and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Toward an Expanded Use of Rule JOB-5, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
1439 (2004). See also Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of
Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 398 (2005).
3. "The past decade has seen a rapid increase in the number, size and scope of
transnational companies[,] . . .growing from 3,000 in 1990 to 13,000 within ten
years." Hall, supra note i.
4. Moldof, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. For purposes of this article, the author only discusses publicly traded
business entities incorporated in any U.S. jurisdiction, subject to regulation by the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and required to register with the SEC
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (2006).
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principles governing labor standards because ICs are essentially
immune from any legitimate ramifications due to jurisdictional
limitations.7 ICs are able to avoid responsibility for these violations
under U.S. and international regulations because the "laws and
obligations pertain primarily to state actors, not to private actors in the
international arena." 8 Before concern of the impunity of ICs can be
resolved, the effect ICs have on labor and human rights internationally
must be identified. Lack of transparency and accountability make
tracking the impact ICs have on the international community,
specifically in relation to labor and human rights practices,
particularly problematic. Elucidation of human rights reporting
processes is the first step for U.S. businesses towards becoming more
responsible participants in the international business community. At a
minimum, ICs should be subject to disclosure requirements regarding
these issues, consistent with the spirit and purposes of the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) 9 as applied to labor and human rights
disclosures. Enhanced disclosure requirements will encourage ICs to
become more cognizant of their corporate footprint and conscientious
of the impact of their activities internationally.
The purpose of this article is to identify why federal legislation is
the best, most efficient option for promoting transparency and
initiating the progression of public disclosures regarding human rights
liabilities for ICs. 10 Federal legislation will provide a timeframe and
identify standards for ICs, and consequentially, the SEC will have to
promulgate regulations in order to comply with federal requirements.
First, it is important to understand the current regulatory scheme
dictating mandatory disclosures already applicable to ICs; this will be
discussed in Part II. Part III discusses of some of the current statutory
and administrative rules governing reporting requirements for publicly
traded corporations.
It also discusses the process for including
shareholder initiatives regarding human rights disclosures in annual
meetings. Next, some of the initiatives ICs have taken independent of

7. Cherington, supra note 2, at 1440.
8. Id.
9. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) was created pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and it is the governing agency for publicly traded
securities. Securities Exchange Act § 78d.
10. Alternatives to legislation are discussed infra Part V.A.
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their legal obligations to show a commitment to social responsibility
are identified, 1 ' thereby providing evidence that many ICs are already
participating in some sort of disclosure or reporting as part of their
regular business practices. Part IV of this article discusses internal
tactics ICs implement to create and manage standards of corporate
responsibility at the organizational level. Finally, Part V identifies the
channels through which modification of the reporting requirements of
ICs can be achieved. It also isolates a legitimate opportunity to utilize
the unique social and political climate to promote improvement of
labor standards internationally.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO REGULATION
A. Footprintson the InternationalCommunity
The footprints ICs leave internationally are evident on a variety of
levels. 12 Human rights organizations 13 and non-governmental
organizations have been instrumental in bringing some of these
concerns to public attention. 14 In 2005, a complaint was filed against
Walmart alleging a variety of injuries sustained by workers in the
factories of Walmart sub-contractors in China, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Swaziland, and Nicaragua. 15 The list of grievances included claims of
forced overtime, wages inconsistent with legal requirements, and
11. The concepts of social responsibility, corporate responsibility, and
corporate social responsibility are used interchangeably for purposes of this article.
These concepts refer to the environmental and social impact ICs have as a result of
their operations.
12. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ON THE MARGINS OF PROFIT: RIGHTS AT RISK
IN
THE
GLOBAL
ECONOMY
(Feb.
18,
2008),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62409/section/1
[hereinafter ON THE MARGINS OF
PROFIT].
13. Id.

14. For example, an organization was established to disseminate information
about Coca-Cola's utilization of labor in Colombia, where exploitation of violence
against union activists is common. See Campaign to Stop Killer Coke,
http://www.killercoke.org/news.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
15. The excerpt of the Walmart complaint referenced is available in The
Global Workplace. ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE:
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW 591-96 (2007); see also

Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district
court's dismissal for failure to state a claim).
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unsafe working conditions. 16 Specifically, "[t]he lawsuit accuses
Walmart subcontractors of paying wages below the legal minimum,
forcing workers to work overtime without compensation, locking
workers in factories, physically abusing employees, withholding
' 17
months' worth of pay, and punishing workers who try to unionize."
These accusations seem quite detached from the image of a
responsible international participant the retail juggernaut strives to
perpetuate. 18 Yet, as recently as 2008, the New York Times reported
19
Walmart was still connected to the exploitation of laborers in China.
The article indicated Walmart obtained products from a Chinese
factory employing child laborers. 20 Almost a year later in October
2008, yet another report was published recounting the abusive
conditions in a Walmart garment factory primarily supplying
children's attire, this time in Bangladesh.21 Over three years after the
2005 complaint was filed against Walmart on behalf of workers,
researchers were still identifying many of the same poor working
conditions in factories supplying goods to the company.22 Workers
again complained about compulsory overtime without pay and low
wages. 23 Some laborers reported earning as little as twenty U.S.

16. BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 592.
17.

See Lawsuit Claims Wal-Mart Condones Overseas Sweatshops, ETHICS

NEWSLINE, Sept. 19, 2009, http://www.globalethics.org/newsline/2005/09/19/
lawsuit-claims-wal-mart-condones-overseas-sweatshops/.
18. For Walmart's explanation of how it strives to become a better, more
sustainable company, see Walmart, Sustainability, http://walmartstores.com/
Sustainability/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2009). For example, in late 2009 Walmart
subsidiary Sam's Club announced plans to carry Brazilian fair trade coffee. See
Carly Weeks, Cadbury Dips Into Fair-TradeMarket, GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 26,

2009, at Ll.
19. David Barboza, In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008.
20. Id.
21. BJORN CLAESON, SWEATSHOP SOLUTIONS? ECONOMIC GROUND ZERO IN
BANGLADESH AND WAL-MART'S RESPONSIBILITY 6 (Victoria Kaplan ed., 2008),
http://www.sweatfree.org/docs/SFCSweatshopSolutions-loRes.pdf. The report was
compiled using results from exhaustive interviews with almost 100 workers in
Bangladesh between September 2007 and September 2008. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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dollars per month, below Bangladesh legal requirements, 24 and
drastically lower than the U.S. federal minimum wage standard.25
Additionally, they reported regular subjection to physical and verbal
26
abuse.
Despite these complaints, it is difficult to hold Walmart and other
companies responsible without any legitimate mechanisms for
accountability. 27 According to Robert Reich, former U.S. Secretary of
Labor, Walmart is merely an effective business model of American
capitalism.2 8 Namely, "'Wal-Mart has devised an extremely efficient
way to deliver low prices to consumers and good returns to
shareholders.' ' 29 Adds Reich, "'[i]f we are not happy about the
results, then the real question we ought to be asking ourselves is
whether we should be changing the rules."' 30 Unfortunately, the
contention of abusive practices used by Walmart is not the only
illustration of how ICs impact workers globally.
For almost seventy years Firestone has operated a rubber
plantation in Liberia. 3' In 2007, a complaint against Firestone was
filed in federal district court. 32 Petitioners were described as poverty
stricken Africans, trapped in a system with quotas so unattainable that
child laborers must work alongside their parents in order for families
to meet their mandated rubber collection requirements. 33 The workers
alleged regular exposure to the dangers of raw rubber and substandard

24. Id.
25. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006). The current
federal minimum wage is $7.25. Id.
26. CLAESON, supra note 21, at 6.
27. See Joseph Nocera, Our Love-Hate Relationship With Wal-Mart, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at C1 (explaining that Walmart is a company that "for the most
part, has played by the rules we as a society have set for it.").
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Dire Working and Living Conditions in Firestone Rubber Plantation
Exposed, NEWS FROM AFRICA: PRESS REvIEw (Liberia), May 25, 2005, availableat

http://newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_10283.html [hereinafter Dire
Working].
32. Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
33. Id. at 992.
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sewage systems, compromising their health.3 4 Firestone was accused
of failing to provide safe working conditions and exploiting the
Liberian government's failure to intervene on behalf of these people.3 5
These are just a few examples demonstrative of exploitative practices
36
used by companies functioning internationally.
B. Get a Brain-It'sthe Economy
With announcements of layoffs from companies across the nation
becoming commonplace, 37 there is considerable concern about the
U.S. economy's fragility. 3 8 Today's economic crisis is frighteningly
similar to the post-Enron market conditions that sparked substantial
corporate reform in 2002.39 During the Enron crisis, the resulting
decline in investor confidence resulted in serious damage to the New
York Stock Exchange as the value of securities plummeted. 40 Richard
A. Grasso, Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange during the
34. Id. at 994-95.
35. Id.
36. For more examples of how ICs leave their mark on the international
community, see ON THE MARGINS OF PROFIT, supra note 12.
37. See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Yahoo Profit Falls; Up to 1,500 Jobs to Be Cut,
U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 22, 2008, at 9A (reporting a possible 1,500 layoffs in San
Francisco); Beth Healy, Fidelity Adds 1,700 Layoffs in Start of 2009, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 15, 2008, at 9 (detailing the second wave of layoffs in Boston
following the release of 1,300 employees on November 12, 2008); Ashlee Vance,
Crisis Hits Tech Sector With Layoffs as Sales Slump, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008
(reporting the Sun Microsystem announcement to cut between 5,000 and 6,000
workers, accounting for approximately fifteen to eighteen percent of the company's
total workforce); Dominic Gates, Boeing Plans Layoffs, Consolidationof Flight-test
Operations,
SEAT'LE
TIMES,
Oct.
16,
2009,
available
at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/boeingaerospace/2010074087_boeing 16.html
(reporting that Boeing plans to lay off 200 to 300 workers in the Puget Sound
region); Kara Spak & Fran Spielman, Layoff Notices for Bus Drivers, Other CTA
Workers, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, at 9 (reporting layoffs of nearly 2,000
employees).
38. David Leonhardt, Top Priorityis Stabilizing the Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2008, at B 1.
39. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr., Corporate Conduct: The Legislation;
Senate Backs Tough Measures to Punish CorporateMisdeeds, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2002, at Al.
40. Patrick McGeehan, After the "Darkest Year," A Changed Wall St., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at 31.
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Enron scandal, commented on the 2002 crisis. 41 Grasso compared the
financial catastrophe to the 1929 stock market collapse; 42 the trigger
ultimately leading to the worst financial catastrophe in U.S. historythe Great Depression.43 However, the 110th Congress responded
quickly by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), mandating
harsher punishments and more extensive regulation for corporate
executives.44 These new regulations were "reflect[tive of] the
extraordinary momentum that corporate reform legislation... gained
in the wake of... scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and Tyco. ' 45
The reforms included significant changes increasing liability for
corporate wrongdoers; the text of the SOA incorporated specific
accountability mechanisms for officers of ICs. 46 The new regulations
signified a response to the demand from the public to47 hold people
accountable for the accuracy and veracity of disclosures.
The existing financial emergency in the United States mirrors, and
is much worse than, the 2002 economic environment. 48 In response to

this crisis, Americans have overwhelmingly called for change,
particularly palpable during the 2008 election. 49 Over three million
people contributed to the 2008 presidential election campaign effort,
and on November 4, 2008 an estimated 135 million votes were cast
across the country by U.S. citizens. 50 "The country wants a change. It
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. For more information about the causes and impact of the Great
Depression, see MURRAY M. ROTHBARD, AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION (The
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 5th ed. 2000).
44. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).
45. Oppel, supra note 39.
46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 7241. This section of the Act, entitled "Corporate
Responsibility for Financial Reports," is indicative of the type of additional duties
and requirements for officers. Id.
47. Oppel, supra note 39.
48. Wall Street Sells Off as Consumers Snap Wallets Shut, TRADE ARABIA,
Nov. 15, 2008. This is the "worst financial crisis in 80 years." Id.
49. See Closing Arguments: Campaign 2008, NAT'L REv., Nov. 3, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 25810607 [hereinafter Campaign 2008]. See also

Leonhardt, supra note 38 ("This year's election coincided with an important
moment in the financial crisis.").
50. Sandra Sobieraj Westfall & Bill Hewitt, President-Elect Barack Obama:
"All Things are Possible," PEOPLE WEEKLY, Nov. 17, 2008, at 52.
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is fed up with both parties, but especially Republicans after eight years
of Bush. The financial crisis has heightened that mood.",5 ' Voters not
only replaced a Republican president with a Democratic candidate, but
Democrats also won Congressional seats across the United States.52
The excitement around the election spawned a new generation of
activists engaged in government. 53 This resulted in a political and
social environment ripe for legislation mandating some recognizable
standards of corporate responsibility and reporting requirements for
labor rights 54 issues. 55 This call for greater accountability and
transparency signifies the possibility of extending reforms beyond
what has historically been limited to economic regulation, 56 and the
opportunity for human rights activists to support reporting and
accountability mechanisms applicable to ICs. This creates a unique

51. Campaign2008, supra note 49.
52. "[T]he Democrats in Tuesday's elections expanded their majorities in both
the House and the Senate." David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Democrats in
Congress Vowing To Pursue an Aggressive Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at
Al. The authors estimated at that time that the Democrats picked up five seats in the
Senate and nineteen in the House. Id.
53. See Opinion, Let's Get Better at Listening to Young People, THE MORNING
CALL, Nov. 14, 2008, at AlIl (indicating that over twenty million votes were cast by
people aged eighteen to thirty, up two million from the 2000 presidential election).
54. Many scholars have connected the concept of labor rights as a basic human
right, and for the purpose of this article these terms are used interchangeably. See
generally JAMES A. GROSS, WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) (a

collection of articles describing the concept of labor rights functioning as a
fundamental human right, particularly in relationship to U.S. labor practices).
55. According to an interview with Trina Hamilton, Ph.D., assistant professor
at the State University of New York at Buffalo, "[t]he Wall Street crisis could
ultimately change the way society views corporate responsibility." Press Release,
University at Buffalo, What Will Financial Crisis Mean for "Corporate
Responsibility?" (Oct. 6, 2008). Dr. Hamilton hypothesizes that "if the public debate
shifts toward a greater willingness to re-regulate, then companies are going to have
to plan to compete in a new, more leveled regulatory environment, rather than using
voluntary corporate responsibility initiatives as a means to stand out from the
competition." Id.
56. Dr. Hamilton hypothesizes that hesitance to enact additional regulations
will decrease as the United States approaches a "final tipping point" resulting from
the culmination of the Enron-like scandals and the current financial crisis. Id.
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opportunity for advocating improved regulation of labor activities
internationally; specifically through the SEC.57
III.

EXISTING LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING CORPORATIONS

Any corporation issuing shares or stocks to the public is required
to register with, and is governed by, the SEC. 58 By virtue of offering
shares or stock to the public without an applicable exemption, a
corporation subjects itself to regulation. 59 The SEC functions to
protect "a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of such transactions... to insure the
60
maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions."
Requirements promulgated by the SEC have become the prevailing
legal thresholds dictating disclosure requirements for ICs issuing
securities.61 Pursuant to the authority given to the SEC through the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, some of the priorities of the SEC
include: "[p]ublic disclosure of pertinent facts" relating to a public
offering, 62 enforcement of disclosure requirements and regulation in
trading,63 investigation of fraud,64 issuance and enforcement of
sanctions 65 and general supervision, administration, and regulatory

57. Other authors have discussed the role of the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) in requiring social disclosures. However, this discussion has
been limited to disclosures required under existing SEC regulations. See, e.g.,
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (2006). The code
requires that "[e]very issuer which is engaged in interstate commerce, or in a
business affecting interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce" shall register with the
SEC. Id. Securities that are exempted from regulation are not discussed in this
article.
59. Id. § 781(a).
60. Id. § 78b.
61. Pursuant to its authority, the SEC can determine reporting requirements for
publicly traded corporations. Id. § 78q.
62. Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 200.1(a) (2002).
63. Id. § 200.1(b)-(c).
64. Id. § 200.1(d).
65. Id.
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responsibilities. 66 With these purposes in mind, the SEC has created
rules for ICs governing disclosures related to initial public offering
and tender offer disclosures and annual reporting requirements. 6 ' The
68
SEC's S-K form itemizes required disclosures for ICs.
A. Required Disclosures
Existing SEC disclosure requirements apply in a variety of
capacities. ICs are required to make annual financial disclosures and
submit registration statements in addition to other disclosure
requirements. 6 9 ICs also are obligated to prepare any other reports the
SEC determines necessary pursuant to their power. 70 This results in
broad regulatory power for the SEC. As the purpose of the SEC is to
protect the public in securities transactions, 1 it is no surprise that
truthfulness and accuracy are priorities.7 2 This is particularly evident
in SEC requirements governing security offerings which mandate that
materials related to the sale must not be misleading.7 3 A statement is
misleading if it includes either a false statement of material fact, or if
it fails to include a material detail made in the offering document that
is misleading. 74 A material statement is anything with a "substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to purchase the security registered., 75 This

66. Id. § 200.1(f)-(h).
67. See id. § 229.10. These reports must be filed with the principal office of
the SEC or via electronic submission through the EDGAR system. See id. § 202.7.
See also Williams, supra note 57, at 1207.
68. Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.702
(2002).
69. Id. § 240.13a-1.
70.

Id. § 232.101 (delineating mandatory electronic submissions).

71. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
72. The prohibition of misleading materials appears in a variety of places. See,
e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Securities and Exchange
Commission, 17 C.F.R § 240.13b2-2 (2002); id. § 230.156(a).

73. Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(a) (2002).
74. Id. § 230.156(a).
75. Id. § 230.405.
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materiality requirement is enforceable by the SEC 76 and through a
private right of action.77 Following the collapse of Enron, liability for
failure to disclose material facts in financial reports became more
stringent. 78
In addition to the disclosures ICs are required to make pursuant to
annual and initial public offering reporting requirements, ICs must
provide information to shareholders in conjunction with an IC's
annual meeting. 79 Before the meeting, ICs are required to send out
materials to shareholders about what proposals will be voted on at the
meeting. 80 These statements must also include all information or
trends that are likely to occur or impact the financial condition of the
business. 8 ' Additionally, the Supreme Court has concluded that
information is material and must be included in the statements sent to
shareholders "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
82
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."
Shareholders can also initiate specific proposals to be included at
the meeting, and often times these items are communicated to the
other shareholders via a proxy statement. 83 These proposals are a
shareholder's "recommendation or requirement that the company
84
and/or its board of directors take a [particular] course of action."
However, this privilege is limited to shareholders that own a minimum
76. See id. § 200.1(b) (indicating that the responsibilities of the SEC include
"enforcement of disclosure requirements").
77. Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 (1971) (recognizing a 10b-5 private right of action when an IC denies

access to material information).
78. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush
Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at Al;
Oppel, supra note 39; Sarbanes-Oxley Aims to Address Accounting Scandals, CARD
NEWS, Dec. 11, 2002, availableat 2002 WLNR 7762189. See also supra PartI.
79. As part of the SEC requirements, ICs must communicate with all

beneficial owners regarding the annual shareholder meeting and any items to be
voted on at said meeting. Securities Exchange Act, Obligation of Registrants in
Communicating with Beneficial Owners, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13 (2002).
80. Id. § 240.14a-13(a)

81. Caterpillar, Inc., Release No. 363, 50 S.E.C 903 (Mar. 31, 1992).
82. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 462 U.S. 438, 439 (1976).
83. See Securities Exchange Act, Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.14a-4(a), 240.14a-5, 240.14a-8 (2002).
84. Id. § 240.14a-8.
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of $2,000 or a one percent interest in the total value of a company's
securities. 85 These shareholder proposals are further limited; each
86
qualified shareholder may only submit one proposal per meeting,
and the proposal must be 500 words or less. 87 Failure to comply with
SEC requirements governing shareholder proposals could result in
88
exclusion of the proposal from the shareholder meeting.
B. Legal Limitations
Although the materiality requirement functions with a broad
capacity, 89 the definition of what constitutes a material fact has been
limited. In the absence of a determination that a certain type of
disclosure is material, there is no requirement to disclose. 90 The
deficiency of case law in extending the definition of materiality to
include human ights liabilities, coupled with the lack of SEC
provisions requiring disclosure of such activities, results in no
affirmative duty for ICs to release information about their labor
91
practices internationally.
Utilizing shareholder proposals to internally effect changes in the
practices of ICs to reduce their negative social impact also has
limitations. The concept of the shareholder proposal as a method to
require ICs to become more socially responsible was introduced
almost forty years ago. 92 In the late 1960s, a shareholder initiative
spearheaded by the Medical Committee for Human Rights attempted
to include a vote to amend Dow Chemical Company's core business
85. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
86. See id. § 240.14a-8(c).
87.

See id. § 240.14a-8(d).

88. Id. § 240.14a-8(f)(1). "The company may exclude your proposal, but only
after it has notified you of the problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it.
Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company must notify you in
writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies .... Id.
89. See Cherington, supra note 2, at 1448.
90. A "corporation is believed to have no obligation, unless that obligation is
specially defined by law or contract." Larry Cati Backer, From Moral Obligation to
International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets, and the
MultinationalCorporations,39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 591, 610 (2008).

Regulation of

91. See Cherington, supra note 2, at 1449.
92. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403, 406-07 (1972).
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documents to prohibit the sale of napalm to be used on humans in
Vietnam. 9 3 In 2008, seventeen shareholder proposals were included in
94
the annual Exxon Mobile shareholder meeting.
In many cases, the IC may be permitted to exclude the shareholder
proposal altogether. 95 ICs can decline to include a shareholder
proposal if it is in violation of the law or proxy rules, is irrelevant,
cannot be enforced by the IC, deals with day to day management
operations, related to an election, furthers a personal interest, conflicts
with a company's proposal, has already been implemented, or is
duplicative. 9 6 If and when these provisions are included in shareholder
proposals, they still must be voted on by shareholders, and oftentimes,
they fail. 97
IV. WHAT CORPORATIONS HAVE THE COURAGE TO

Do ON THEIR OWN

Outside the mandatory reporting required by the SEC, 98 many ICs
have taken independent initiatives to show their dedication to
responsible business practices, including making affirmative
commitments to protect human rights. 99 The concept of corporate
responsibility has become "the norm instead of the exception within
the world's largest companies."' 0 0 Consequently, ICs are in a unique
93. See id. at 661.
94. Letter from Paul S. Atkins, SEC Comm'r, to U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(July
22,
2008)
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/

spch072208psa.htm.
95. Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2002).
96. Id.
97. See generally Press Release, CRS Newswire, Shareholder Proposals
Receive Record Support at Exxon Mobil Annual Meeting (June 7, 2002), available
at http://www.csrwire.com/PressRelease.php?id=1 147 (discussing the inclusion of a
variety of human rights and other proposals, all the which failed at the 2002 Exxon
shareholder meeting). In SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins' release to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Atkins commented on the nearly twenty shareholder
resolutions proposed at the 2008 Exxon Mobil shareholder meeting. In a repeat of
the 2002 meeting, all of the shareholder proposals failed. Atkins, supra note 94.
98. See supra Part II.
99. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 158 (1997).
100.

KPMG,

REPORTING

2

INTERNATIONAL

(2008),

SURVEY

OF

CORPORATE

RESPONSIBILITY

http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndlnsights/
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position to have the potential to make a substantial impact on the
development of human rights. 10 '
A. Corporate Codes of Conduct
Conventionally, the responsibilities of corporations have not
02
included an obligation to protect human rights internationally.
However, over the last decade, in response to criticism about
international practices, many ICs have adopted a corporate code of
03
conduct (CCC) to dictate policies and procedures for their practices.'
Today, nearly every organization has some guiding principles about
the management of labor activities.10 4 The support of the CCC extends
beyond just the business arena, and use of the CCC has permeated
virtually every major industry. 0 5 Many of these codes include
provisions protecting the rights of workers. 10 6 As a result of the
SOA, 107 the SEC requires ICs to have a CCC or some other form of
ethics policy, but this policy need only apply to executive level
officers.10 8 However, many ICs extend the use of the CCC to also
10 9
provide standards for supervising their international operations.
Although the concept of obligating ICs to create and maintain a CCC
to protect labor rights internationally has been discussed in

ArticlesPublications/Documents/International-corporate-responsibility-survey008.pdf.

101. "Some of the most significant non-state actors in the world today are
private corporations, specifically [transnational corporations]." Frey, supra note 99,
at 158 (emphasis added).
102. See id. at 154.
103. See id.
104. See Owen Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes Of Conduct: What's
Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349, 349 (2001).

105. Id. (noting that codes now exist in the "apparel, oil, electronics, and
general manufacturing" industries).
106.

Id. at 349-50.

107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).
108. Peter Rossiter et al., A Closer Look at Codes of Ethics, 15 SAy. & CMTY.
BANKER 26,26 (2006).
109. Richard Lock & Monica Romis, Improving Work Conditions in a Global
Supply Chain: Labor Laws and Legislation, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Mar. 15,

2007, at 54.
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Congress, 110 no action has been taken to codify the resolution. An IC's
formation and adherence to a CCC to protect workers is largely
voluntary.
B. Reporting Initiatives
In addition to creating a CCC, many ICs have also begun
publishing some form of a corporate responsibility report (CRR),
either independently or using some other set of standards for their
reporting.1 l ' KPMG is an audit, tax, and advisory firm that provides
services to assist businesses with maintaining compliance with a
variety of regulatory and self-imposed schematics, including ethics
reporting. 112 In its 2008 International Survey of Corporate
Responsibility Reporting," 3 KPMG found that between 2005 and
2008, the number of organizations releasing some variety of a CRR
increased by thirty percent.1 14 As giants in their respective industries,
companies like Pepsi,' 15 Deloitte,' 16 and Staples1 17 all issued CRRs for
2007.

110. See Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 2782, 107th Cong. (2001). As
written, the legislation would require "[a] national of the United States that employs
more than 20 persons in a foreign country, either directly or through subsidiaries...
[to] take the necessary steps to implement the Corporate Code of Conduct." Id.
§ 3(a).
111. Compare Press Release, Business Editors/Beverage Writers, The Pepsi
Bottling Group Releases 2007 Corporate Responsibility Report (Oct. 6, 2008) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Pepsi] (using the Global Reporting Initiative standards
for the report) with Press Release, Deloitte, Deloitte Releases Inaugural Corporate
Responsibility Report (Oct. 2, 2008) (on file with author) available at 10/2/08 PR
Newswire 12:48:00 [hereinafter Deloitte] (relying on alternative guidelines for
report compilation).
112. See generally About KPMG, http://us.kpmg.com/about/ethics.asp (last
visited Dec. 9, 2009).
113. KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 100, at 2. "KPMG conducts
the International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting every three years to
gain insight into CSR reporting and to contribute to the evolving global dialogue on
transparency and accountability. The 2008 survey was conducted in 22 countries and
with more than 2200 businesses around the world." Id.
114. Id.
115. Pepsi, supra note I I.
116. Deloitte, supra note I 11.
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Some ICs utilize outside sources to provide standards and
guidelines for their CRR." 8 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)is
an example of an entity developed to provide a procedure for creating
a CRR. 19 Focusing on the concept of sustainable development, GRI
provides a guide for ICs to follow when preparing CRRs. t20 "The GRI
Reporting Framework is intended to serve as a generally accepted
framework for reporting on an organization's economic,
environmental, and social performance." 12z' The guidelines include
specific, step by step instructions for ICs dictating how the report
should be compiled, what factors to consider in reporting, how to
weigh and grade each factor, and recommendations about updating
reports. 122 The triggers that GRI uses in determining the human rights
performance of an IC include evaluation of the investment and
procurement practices of an IC, training and policies regarding human
rights issues, respect for indigenous rights, use of child labor, and
collective bargaining practices, amongst other factors. 123 Upon
completion of the report evaluating the various standards GRI
provides, a company earns a grade based on the total from each GRI
standard. 124 The GRI webpage includes a list of companies that
submitted reports, along with a letter grade awarded to the company
based on the various aspects of performance-if the company opts to
publish the grade. 125 Also included on the GRI website is whether a
117. See generally Press Release, Staples, Staples Releases Corporate
Responsibility Report (Sept.9,2008) (on file with author) availableat 2008 WLNR
17829835. Staples began conducting social responsibility audits in 2007. Id.
118. See, e.g., Pepsi, supra note 111. In submitting its 2007 CRR, Pepsi used
the Global Reporting index guidelines. Id.
119. Global
Reporting
Initiative
Home
Page,
http://www.globalreporting.org/home (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
120. Global Reporting Initiative, G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 1,
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE I -BFF25F735
235CA44/0/G3_GuidelinesENU.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2009) [hereinafter GRI
Sustainability Guidelines].
121. Id.at 3.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 33-35.
124. Id. at 38.
125. Global
Reporting
Initiative,
2008
Reports
List,
http://www.globalreporting.org/GRIReports/2008ReportsList/ (last visited Dec. 9,
2008) [hereinafter GRI 2008 Reports List].
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company prepared the report internally or consulted GRI or another
26
entity to have the results verified by a third party. 1
C. Voluntary Associations
Another way ICs have shown commitment to corporate
responsibility is through voluntary association with organizations
dedicated to corporate accountability. The United Nations Global
Compact (UNGC)127 is an example of this type of association.
Businesses, consumers, cities, and students are among those invited to
make a commitment to the UNGC and its ten principles. 128 These
ideals are derived from a variety of international agreements on
human rights and environmental issues. 129 As a business joining the
UNGC, an IC commits to integrate the principles of the UNGC into
business practices and procedures, apply the principles when making
management decisions, aid in facilitation of UNGC objectives, release
30
some sort of annual CRR, and advocate the goals of the UNGC.1
According to Mayor Frank Jackson, Mayor of the City of Cleveland,
members of the UNGC
are voluntarily taking responsibility for the impact of their activities

on customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, communities and
other stakeholders, as well as the environment through
sustainability and ethical business practices. With over 4,000
126. Id.
127. See,
e.g.,
United
Nations
Global
Compact
Home
Page,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Dec. 9, 2009); Global Reporting
Initiative Home Page, http://globalreporting.org (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
128. United
Nations
Global
Compact
Home
Page,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (follow "How to Participate" hyperlink) (last
visited Dec. 9, 2009).
129. United
Nations
Global
Compact
Home
Page,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (follow "About the GC" hyperlink; then follow
"The Ten Principles" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 9, 2009). The Ten Principles of
the United Nations Global Compact originate from The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Id.
130. United
Nations
Global
Compact
Home
Page,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (follow "How to Participate" hyperlink; then
follow "Business Participation" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
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worldwide corporate members, including companies such as CocaCola and Microsoft,
it is the world's largest social responsibility
13 1
movement.
In April 2008, Mayor Jackson announced that Case Western Reserve
University and Cleveland Clinic had joined the many other
organizations as a member of UNGC, making a pledge to corporate
32
social accountability and transparency in business.
D. Limitations on Voluntary Disclosures
Independent initiatives to commit to adherence to international
labor and human rights standards are valuable, but there are
significant limitations to these voluntary programs. The most notable
limitation on the ability of a CCC and CRR to more positively
influence the activities of ICs is the lack of consistency amongst the
various codes of conduct and reporting procedures. 133 This may be
attributable, in part, to an absence of basic, identifiable standards
regarding the conduct of ICs. 134 A CCC is derived at the
organizational level and there are no legal guidelines dictating the
135
content, so ICs can include or exclude any provisions they wish.
"Since the codes are voluntary in nature, they are not written to
impose constraints that [ICs] would find onerous. Instead, the codes
are crafted to promote conduct that, although it entails some costs to
the [IC], brings greater benefits to the [IC].' ' 136 Additionally, a CCC
may not even be enforceable on the organizational level when an IC
1 37
employs third party contractors outside the United States.
131. Press Release, Mayor of Cleveland, City of Cleveland, Case Western
Reserve University and Cleveland Clinic Make Landmark Commitment to Social
Responsibility (Apr. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 111.
134. "Currently, there is no clear indication of the prevalence of basic
corporate citizenship tenets-namely human rights, labour rights, environmental
protection and anti-corruption .... Hall, supra note 1, at 30.
135. The Corporate Code of Conduct Act addressed this issue of basic
corporate citizenship standards; however, the legislation never passed through
Congress. See Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 2782, 107th Cong. (2001).
136. Murphy, supra note 2, at 402.
137. Id. at 401.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009

19

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2009], Art. 2

20

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

Inconsistency also impairs the value of the CRR. Even amongst
companies that completed CRRs using GRI standards, deviations from
the GRI requirements could arise during implementation, as no third
party verification is required before a report is submitted to the GRI.
For example, according to the GRI summary of companies that
submitted CRRs, less than twenty of the U.S. based companies that
submitted these reports to the GRI had the reports verified by either a
third party or the GRI, and many of the organizations failed to include
a letter grade to indicate overall performance based on the factors
identified by the GRI. 138 Although overall the number of ICs releasing
CRRs has increased, the content and factors used in preparing the
39
report are not consistent among those ICs releasing CRRs.1
Another significant restraint on the success of a CCC and CRR as
tools for protecting human rights is enforcement. As to the issue of
non-required disclosures, ICs are effectively self-regulating, and as
such have no affirmative duty to either adopt or utilize any CCC or
participate in any reporting regarding these issues. 140 Inevitably, there
are no ramifications for failing to adhere to the CCC or to release a
CRR.141 With no enforcement, the legitimacy of the CRRs and CCC is
42
considerably reduced. 1
Similarly, the legitimacy of IC membership in associations
designed to promote core labor and human rights standards as an
indicator of an IC's conduct outside the United States is suspect.
There is no clear connection between an IC's relationship with the
UNGC and a reduced negative impact or improvement by member
companies to promote international labor rights. 143 In fact, "[o]f the
103 companies [associated with UNGC] contacted by the investors, 30
GRI 2008 Reports List, supra note 125.
See supra note Il1 and accompanying text.
140. Cherington, supra note 2, at 1449. "Although securities laws do require
disclosure of issues that the SEC has determined to be material to investors, the SEC
has largely deemed immaterial corporate compliance with international human
rights and labor standards. Therefore, there is no mandatory disclosure of such
issues." Id.
141. See supra text accompanying note 90.
142. Consistency is lacking even amongst ICs that use the GRI standards for
submission of CRRs. See supra text accompanying note 90.
143. Helen Warrell, Finance:Social Awareness Urged on Companies, THIRD
138.

139.

SECTOR, Jan. 16, 2008, at 9.
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do not report back to the UN Global Compact on how well they
follow its principles, 48 have shown poor performance and [only] 25
' 144
are being congratulated for their good reporting records.
Membership is not tied to any enforcement mechanism permitting
member expulsion or public notification of poor performance. Even
though the UNGC encourages reporting and other corporate social
responsibility procedures, without ramifications for failure to maintain
a CCC or CRR, 145 the same limitations of the CCC and CRR result.
Furthermore, because voluntary associations allow membership
without requiring accountability, ICs may join for mere appearances,
reaping the benefits of claiming an association with the UNGC
without making any real commitment to changing business practices
to conform to UNGC objectives. 146 Although it seems ICs are
prepared to make the move to more regulated disclosures of human
rights liabilities, the limitations of self-regulatory mechanisms call for
a more legitimate, effective alternative to manage consistency in
human rights reporting.
V. FOLLOW THE LEGISLATIVE ROAD

A. The Legal Pathways to Modification
There are three distinct ways the SEC reporting requirements can
be modified to include human rights disclosures: through a legal
determination by a U.S. federal court that these facts are material to

144. Id.
145. Murphy, supra note 2, at 412. "There is no legal obligation placed upon
the companies and no enforcement of such obligations ....
Id.
146. Symposium, The UN Global Compact: Responsibilityfor Human Rights,
Labor Relations, and the Environment in Developing Nations, 34 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 481, 482 (2001). The fear was,

these corporations would simply cloak themselves in the legitimacy of the
blue UN blanket while they continue to pollute the environment, plunder
national resources and exploit the indigenous workforce, including
children. The price of membership, they argued, was too cheap. After all,
the corporations were only required to commit their support to the
principles of the Compact, and post on the world wide web, at least once a
year, the concrete steps they have taken to act on any of the nine principles
in their own corporations and the lessons learned from doing so.
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shareholders, 147 with revision of the reporting requirements by the
SEC, 148 and through legislation. 149 With each option there are benefits
and limitations, as discussed below.
1. Litigation: Using the 10b-5 ShareholderAction 150 and Alien Tort
15 1
Claims Act

An owner of a security interest can bring a private right of
action15 2 for failure of an IC to disclose a material fact. 153 In order to

assert a successful lOb-5 claim, the shareholder must allege reliance
on a material misrepresentation or omission, either intended or as a
result of recklessness by an IC in a security transaction.1 54 Increasing
147. Shareholder actions could be filed in either state or federal court. With
the goal of achieving a determination from the court that human rights disclosures
are material, federal district court is the proper venue because these courts have
"original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), and this particular
determination would be derived from the regulations and laws of the federal
government. See supra Part III.
148. See Williams, supra note 57, at 1199 (providing a thorough assessment of
the SEC's regulatory powers as applied in a context of social disclosures and
identifying the opportunity for SEC to propagate regulations requiring ICs to make
disclosures about the labor and environmental impact of the company).
149. See infra Part V.B-C.
150. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). In her 2004 comment, author Rachel
Cherington provides a compelling and well researched argument for using lob-5
shareholder derivative actions to expand the materiality definition as a mechanism
for enforcing international human rights standards. Cherington, supra note 2, at
1463-64.
151. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006). Use of the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA) to hold companies liable for human rights transgressions
abroad has also been discussed as a mechanism for IC accountability. See, e.g.,
Shanaira Udwadia, Note, Corporate Responsibilityfor InternationalHuman Rights
Violations, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 359, 362 (2004); Khurram Nasir Gore,
Comment, Xiaoning V. Yahoo!: Piercing The Great Firewall, Corporate
Responsibility, and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L.
97, 98 (2008); Tina Garmon, Comment, Domesticating International Corporate
Responsibility: Holding Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325 (2003).
152. See Superintendent of Ins. of State of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971) and text accompanying note 77.
153. See supra Part III.A. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
154. See Cherington, supra note 2, at 1449-50.
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evidence indicates some investors consider the nature of an IC's
activities and practices when making a socially responsible security
purchase, having the possible effect of making human rights
disclosures "material,"' 55 yet no court has recognized human rights or
labor liabilities as such. Application of the Alien Torts Claims Act
(ATCA) also supports the materiality of an organization's conduct
internationally. Although successful application of the ATCA has
been sporadic, the progression seems to be geared toward expansion
of its use in claims against major corporations for international
conduct. 156 In a Metropolitan Corporate Counsel article warning
international businesses to recognize the potential for liability under
the ATCA, the authors prophesize that "[a]lthough no company has
been held liable.., for human rights abuses carried out abroad,
plaintiffs' lawyers are trying to establish a roadmap for a successful
corporate ... case." 157 Moreover, the Second and Ninth Circuit courts
have alluded to the possibility of successful secondary liability claims
under the ATCA, increasing potential exposure to lawsuits. 158 As
more claims filed pursuant to the ATCA survive preliminary motions
to dismiss, the likelihood that these cases will continue to progress
becomes more palpable. 159 Continued expansion of the ATCA 160 as a
mechanism to hold ICs accountable for their international labor
activities provides tangible verification that this type of conduct
impacts costs to the organization, increasing the likelihood human
161
rights violations are in fact material in securities transactions.

155. The concept of the socially responsible investor provides evidence these
types of disclosures are in fact material. See, e.g., Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially
Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1992).
156. B. Keith Gibson & Jeremy T. Grabill, A Growing Danger on the Horizon
for Companies Doing Business Internationally: CorporateLiability Under the Alien
Tort Statute, METROPOLITAN CORP. CouNs., Feb. 1, 2009, at 34, 34.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The ATCA resulted in the district courts obtaining "original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of

nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
161. See supra note 150.
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Although a court determination that human rights disclosures are
material could feasibly result in greater accountability for ICs, other
aspects of relying on this avenue to improve transparency will likely
delay the process. The most significant barrier is timing. The Speedy
Trial Act of 1974 dictates timelines to ensure that criminal defendants
have access to a speedy trial. 162 However, this is only applicable in
criminal cases. A suit brought pursuant to a lOb-5 shareholder action
would originate in civil court and is not subject to the timeline
requirements of the Speedy Trial Act. 163 Congressional legislation
suggested civil trials be scheduled within eighteen months of the filing
date, but there are no legal guarantees to an expeditious civil trial. 164
Other factors, such as the number of cases filed, court room or
judge availability, and pretrial settlement negotiations may further
impede the progress of a civil case. 165 According to Federal Court
Management Statistics, 257,507 civil cases were filed in federal
district courts in 2007 and took an average of over eight and a half
months to be decided. 166 Of the cases pending in federal court,
167
approximately seven percent were filed over three years ago.
Waiting for a case to be filed and decided does not guarantee an
improved scheme of reporting human rights liabilities and is more
time consuming than necessary, particularly when other options are
available. 168 Additionally, once an action is filed, there is no guarantee
that a court will find human rights disclosures as material.

162. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).
163. Id. The limitation of the Act's applicability to civil cases is evident by the
language in part (a), indicating the Act applies "[i]n any case involving a defendant
charged with an offense." Id.

164. See
Federal
U.S.
Courts
Management
Statistics
Page,
http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html (follow the "District Courts" hyperlink
under "Federal Court Management Statistics-2007," select "All District Courts,"
then click "Generate") (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. For a more comprehensive explanation of some of the timing and other
limitations of the judicial process, see John J. Kerr, Jr. et al., Stage I: Fundamentals
of Commercial Litigation in the United States, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
LITIGATION WORLD WIDE 385 (Charles Platto ed., Kluwer Law International 1998).
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2. Administrative Reform
The SEC is empowered to create administrative regulations to
ensure compliance with federal law. 169 These regulations include any
rule the SEC "prescribes as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest." 170 The scope of this regulatory power is broad but focuses on
public disclosure of information necessary to protect investors when
making determinations about securities purchases. 171 Seemingly,
"because people in the social investor sector of the market are using
socially significant information to make investment decisions, that
information is clearly material to them,"' 172 permitting the SEC to take
action. Amendments or additions to reporting requirements are made
at the discretion of the SEC, and the SEC could feasibly include a
provision mandating disclosure of labor activities of ICs. 17 3 Scholars
have already identified the materiality of social disclosures to
investors and the possibility of the SEC to require human rights
disclosures, yet the SEC has not created any regulations to respond to
the need for transparency in this area. 174
In the past, the SEC has been prodded into action as a result of
public pressure coupled with Congressional activity. 75 Although the
SEC has the power to require more comprehensive reporting, reliance
on the SEC to take initiative is inefficient. Similarly, the courts have
been reluctant to compel the SEC to create rules, 176 so it is unlikely
169. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2006).
170. Id.
171. See supra Part III.A. See generally Securities and Exchange Commission,
17 C.F.R. § 200.1 (2002).

172. Williams, supra note 57, at 1288-89.
173.

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2006); see also

Williams, supra note 57.
174. Williams, supra note 57 (providing an in-depth analysis of the
opportunity and ability for the SEC to promulgate regulations mandating reporting
of social liabilities).
175. See Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent
Environmental Liabilities by Public Companies Under the Federal Securities Laws,

16 HARv. ENvTL.L.REv. 129, 130-31 (1992).
176. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. SEC, 606 F. 2d 1031 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (public interest group sued the SEC for failure to promulgate certain rules
requiring disclosures for ICs and court adopted a narrow review of the SEC's power
to make those determinations).
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that litigation will provide an opportunity to motivate the SEC into
action. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the
regulatory power of the SEC permits only minimal review of the
SEC's promulgation of rules, and even then review is limited to the
determination of whether the SEC regulations are in compliance with
77
other federal law. 1
3. CongressionalAction
During the 1970s, social activists played a pivotal role in creating
additional environmental disclosure requirements for ICs. 17 8 As a
result of the pressure to recognize the importance of obligating ICs to
disclose environmental liabilities, Congress considerably transformed
environmental law. 179 In response, the SEC renovated reporting
180
requirements to ensure compliance with these new regulations.
Similarly, with a new generation of activists, and a new excitement
about involvement in the political process, 181 legislation focused on
creating standards for ICs is likely to have wide support.
Using the dense regulatory scene of the 1970s that changed the
environmental regulatory scheme as a model,' 82 Congress can create a
legislative plan creating identifiable commitments to human rights
disclosures in business. Legislation provides the foundation for a more
comprehensive reporting scheme with general standards to provide
consistency, while permitting the SEC to detail the specifics of the
177. Id. at 1053.

178. Cherington, supra note 2, at 1447. See generally Perry E. Wallace,
Disclosure of EnvironmentalLiabilities Under the Securities Laws: The Potentialof
Securities-Market-Based Incentives Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv.

1093, 1097 (1993) (discussing the change in SEC environmental reporting
requirements, and the potential of such changes to provide incentives to businesses,
consequently resulting in pollution reduction).
179. In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2006). Along with other
initiatives, this contributed to a series of new SEC regulations modifying the
reporting requirements for ICs. See generally Geltman, supra note 175; Wallace,
supra note 178.
180. See Geltman, supra note 175, at 130-3 1.
181. See supra Part II.B.
182. For examples of how legislation initiated changed in the SEC reporting
requirements, see Geltman, supra note 175; see also Wallace, supra note 178.
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reporting requirements. This will result in more comprehensive and
reliable reporting procedures for ICs.
B. How DisclosuresBenefit ICs
ICs benefit greatly from transparency in business. 183 Socially
responsible investments account for over ten percent of managed
assets in a trillion dollar industry,1 84 and socially responsible investors
make investment decisions factoring in the social impacts beyond
required SEC disclosures. 185 A recent report conducted by Boston
College Center for Corporate Citizenship showed that public opinion
about an organization's reputation is linked to the public perception of
how that company's corporate governance functions; particularly a
company's ethics and transparency' 86 Image and brand recognition
are valuable commodities for ICs, and the public 87view of an IC's
reputation can positively or negatively impact sales.'
The concept of socially responsible investing is not limited to the
purpose of promoting specific social agendas, rather it is "simply good
business."' 88 According to director Paul Hilton of Advanced Equities
Research at Calvert Investments, "[p]eople realize that investing in
companies with better performance in issues of environmental, social,
and corporate governance will help them identify companies with
better financial performance, either because of less risk or because
189
they're better managed."
183.

Elizabeth Wine, SRI Plows the Path to Profitability,ON WALL STREET,

Aug. 1, 2009, at 26 ("Socially responsible investing is no longer the province of
college professors who want to save the world. It's evolving and going mainstream
in a big way.").
184. Adam J. Sulkowski et al., CorporateResponsibility Reporting in China,
India, Japan, and the West: One Mantra Does Not Fit All, 42 NEW ENG. L. REv.

787, 789 (2008). See also Wine, supra note 183. Socially responsible "investments
in the U.S. alone account for $2.7 trillion." Id.
185. Hylton, supra note 155, at 7-8.
186.

Perception of Corporate Responsibility Linked to Reputation, CSR

NEWSWIRE, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.csrwire.com/News/13470.html.
187.

See, e.g., Stanley Ziemba, Pepsi Yields, Ends Burma Venture, CHI. TRIB.,

Apr. 24,
workers,
188.
189.

1996, at 1 (stating that in response to protests about the conditions of
Pepsi closed its operations in Burma).
Wine, supra note 183.
Id.
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The returns of organizations toting banners of social responsibility
reconcile this idea. Companies with functioning corporate social
1 90
responsibility plans have reported increased financial success.
Moreover, ICs that prepare CRRs are able to more readily identify
areas of opportunity, permitting them to increase profitability through
reduction of costs. 191 As head of the newly developed Corporate
Responsibility and Sustainability group at Burr Pilger & Mayer LLP
and associate director of the GRI, James C. Murphy, Ph.D.
acknowledged some of the business benefits of improved social
reporting. According to Murphy, "'[c]ompanies who undertake
integrated corporate responsibility and sustainability programs will
gain a competitive advantage over others in their respective sectors;
more and more, this means understanding and recognizing the value
of financial and non-financial data for overall business performance
and competitiveness.' 192 Improving disclosure requirements to
encourage transparency will result in a better public perception of an
organization and, overall, will likely increase an IC's market and
profits.
C. Authority for Legislation
The most appropriate venue for modification of human rights
reporting requirements for ICs is through Congressional legislation.
Pursuant to their authority to regulate interstate commerce, Congress
has the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper"
to effectively manage interstate transactions. 193 In clarifying this
authority, the Supreme Court has identified this regulatory power as
an affirmative authority 194 with broad and comprehensive legislative

190. Sulkowski et al., supra note 184, at 789 ("[T]here is growing evidence of
a demonstrable positive correlation between good financial performance and
successful management of commitments to corporate responsibilities.").
191. Id. at 794.
192. Press Release, Business Wire, BPM & MacKenzie Communications
Launch Joint Venture Focused on Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability (Sept.
18, 2008) (on file with author).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 551
(1944) (indicating that limiting the ability to regulate certain types of transactions
deprives Congress of the power derived from the interstate commerce clause).
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control. Historically, the Court has identified the power of Congress to
manage interstate commerce as "supreme and paramount."' 95 "It is the
congress, and not the judicial department, to which the constitution
has given the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states. The courts can never take the initiative on
this subject."' 196 Similarly, this power belongs solely to Congress; the
individual states do not have the power to regulate interstate
commerce activities. 197 "It is elementary and well settled that there
can be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and that the acts
of Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive."'1 98 Thus, the
most legitimate source for enhancing the requirements of ICs is
Congress.
D. The Road Home: Legislative Proposal
Congress is in a position to initiate legislation to spark human
rights reporting requirements to be promulgated by the SEC. 199
Initiating standards and commitments to monitoring human rights
activities internationally, while permitting the SEC to determine the
best procedures to meet these new demands as defined by the
legislature, is the most efficient option for requiring human rights
disclosures. Waiting for the courts to decide the issue of whether
human rights concerns are material may be time consuming,
particularly because no such determination has been made in the past.
Similarly, a court decision regarding the materiality of such issues
may not result in a requirement for human rights disclosures,
primarily because courts have declined to require the SEC to create
rules regarding these types of issues. Additionally, it is unlikely that
the SEC will initiate regulations altering reporting requirements
independent of some legislative initiative. But past performance
indicates that the SEC can successfully implement and maintain a
regulatory scheme adhering to the changing needs and priorities of
195. Parkersburg & Ohio River Transp. Co. v. City of Parkersburg, 107 U.S.
691, 739 (1883).

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 740-41 (emphasis added).
Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408 (1925).
Id.
This concept has been effective in the environmental context. See e.g.,

Geltman, supra note 175.
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commission's compliance with federal environmental reforms, and is
an example of how the SEC has effectively addressed compliance
with similar legislative direction by incorporating new environmental
standards into existing reporting requirements. 20 1 New legislation
identifying standards for U.S. companies will result in new SEC rules
regarding human rights disclosures, which in turn has 2the
effect of
02
holding ICs accountable for providing reliable disclosure.
Overall, ICs are prepared for more comprehensive disclosure
requirements pertaining to human rights. Many ICs have already
included corporate responsibility practices through reporting and
adopting a CCC as part of their standard operating procedures.20 3
Independent auditing agencies have begun integrating corporate
responsibility accounting as part of their services. 20 4 The next step
requires Congressional action to create legislation to motivate the SEC
to create rules governing disclosures, similar to those initiatives
passed in the 1970s.
In addition to the benefits disclosure will have for participating
ICs, new disclosure requirements result in improved public access to
an IC's impact on international labor and human rights issues. Greater
public access to this information will encourage ICs to be more
cognizant of decisions pertaining to labor. In the past, the public has
played an instrumental role in influencing how ICs conduct
business. 20 5 For example, in the mid-1990s Pepsi was criticized for
having operations in Burma, a country widely recognized for human

200. Wallace, supra note 178, at 1098; Geltman, supra note 175, at 133
("Before the state and federal governments enacted comprehensive environmental
legislation, the securities laws had no provisions expressly relating to disclosure of
registrants' environmental policies or contingent environmental liabilities.").
201. See Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 200.550 (2002).
202. See generally Michael L. Hickok & Janet S. Hoffman, Section Job-5
Claimsfor Non-Disclosure of Contingent Cleanup Liabilities, 3 ToXics L. REP. 315
(Aug. 3, 1988).
203. See supra Part IV.
204. See, e.g., BPM & MacKenzie Communications Launch Joint Venture,
supra note 192.
205. Boni Brewer & Wylie Wong, Pepsi's Ties to Burma Cost it UC-Berkeley
Contract,CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 11, 1996, at A10.
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rights abuses. 20 6 Activists across the country protested Pepsi's bottling
venture in Burma, ultimately leading to Pepsi's withdrawal from the
area. 20 7 Today, Pepsi participates in corporate responsibility reporting
through the GRI.20 8 Likewise, this increased access to information
could inspire a public response and call for ICs to behave more
responsibly when conducting business.
VI. CONCLUSION

ICs are powerful entities. The reach of the IC is often well beyond
the borders of the United States and the laws that govern them.
Continued expansion of ICs worldwide requires improved regulation
to ensure that the protections afforded workers inside the United
States are applied to ICs with labor forces in other countries. Creation
and passage of legislation targeted at recognizing the negative impacts
ICs have on labor and human rights enforcement internationally and
obligating disclosure of these activities will result in the fuel necessary
to motivate the SEC to change the reporting requirements for ICs.
Improved transparency will elucidate potential issues of abusive
behavior occurring outside the United States for shareholders and
potential investors and the public. Unfettered access to an IC's
international conduct regarding core issues of human rights and labor
practices will result in greater accountability of ICs both to
shareholders and the public, and will ultimately result in more socially
responsible businesses.

206.
207.
208.

Id.
Ziemba, supra note 187.
GRI 2008 Reports List, supra note 125.
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